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Civil society organizations have warned that if “lethal autonomous weapons 
systems” (LAWS) are created, such weapons would cause serious problems with 
regards to human rights. Although “fully autonomous” weapons do not exist at 
this stage, several countries are thought to have developed “semi-autonomous” 
weapons equipped with artificial intelligence. LAWS related issues have been a part 
of international discussions in the United Nations, and the Japanese government has 
actively participated in these conferences. Japanese politicians have also discussed 
issues related to LAWS in the National Diet since 2015. This article provides multiple 
paradigms of Japan’s policy toward LAWS from the perspectives of international 
relations theory, and attempts to explore possible solutions to the international 
regulation of LAWS in international law.
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Introduction
The international community has been warned by civil society of future scenarios 
in which human beings may be targeted and killed by “autonomous weapons 
systems” or “killer robots” which are reminiscent of the popular film The 
Terminator (Kowalska 2018). On November 19, 2012, Human Rights Watch and 
International Human Rights Clinic (IHRC) of Harvard Law School published 
a report encouraging the ban of killer robots, defined as “fully autonomous 
weapons that could select and engage targets without human intervention” 
(Human Rights Watch and International Human Rights Clinic Human Rights 
Program at Harvard Law School 2012, 1). The fifty-page long report is one of 
the first publications addressing the legal prohibition of killer robots by a non-
governmental organization (NGO) that warns of the potential danger of killer 
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robots in light of human rights and international law (Human Rights Watch 
2012). The “Campaign to Stop Killer Robots” (2013) as a group of NGOs sparked 
international debate on the legal and ethical questions regarding the development 
of killer robots, or “lethal autonomous weapons systems” (LAWS). Although the 
scope of LAWS or killer robots has not been clearly defined as of yet, they have 
been referred to as “weapons that can select, detect, and engage targets with little 
to no human intervention” (Evans and Salmanowitz 2019).
In 2013, the United Nations (UN) decided to discuss concerns about LAWS 
within the framework of the “Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons” 
(CCW), which prohibits or restricts the use of specific weapons that “may be 
deemed to be excessively injurious or to have indiscriminate effects” (UNOG 
2019a). The CCW was signed in 1980 in Geneva and entered into effect in 1983. 
International discussions regarding legal prohibition of LAWS at the CCW 
began in 2014. Meanwhile, over 1,000 leading researchers and business leaders, 
such as Stephen Hawking, Elon Musk, and Steve Wozniak, signed an open letter 
calling for a ban on killer robots as fully autonomous weapons on July 27, 2015 
(Zakrzewski 2015). On August 21, 2017, Elon Musk led a group of 116 specialists 
on artificial intelligence (AI) in submitting a letter requesting a ban on killer 
robots to the UN. They argued that the creation of killer robots should be legally 
banned because such technology would bring about the third revolution in 
warfare, followed by the invention of the gun and nuclear weapons (Guardian 
2017).
Parties at the discussions on the CCW can be divided into those supporting 
early regulation or prohibition of LAWS and those against such measures. 
In particular, the United States, Russia, and China have shown reluctance in 
supporting the legal prohibition of the development of LAWS because they 
fear that such a regulation could be disadvantageous for their military strategy. 
Indeed, it has been considered that the United States, China, Israel, Russia, South 
Korea, and the United Kingdom have already developed “semi-autonomous” 
weapons systems as “precursors” of fully autonomous weapons systems (Japan 
Today 2014).
Japan has supported the CCW framework and the annexed Protocols 
(MOFA 2018a, 239-40). Internationally, the Japanese government has dispatched 
delegations to a variety of international discussions on the LAWS issues. 
Domestically, Japanese politicians have been asking questions concerning 
LAWS at the National Diet of Japan, the Japanese parliament, since 2015; but, 
the Japanese government has been unwilling to create a legally binding treaty 
to ban LAWS at this stage because the government is concerned about whether 
such a regulation would have the potential to hinder development of Japan’s AI 
technology for national defense.
Four research questions regarding Japan’s policy on LAWS are raised here. 
First, what are the reasons for Japanese politicians to support legal prohibition of 
 International Regulation of “Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems” (LAWS) 313
LAWS with regard to Japan’s postwar normative factors? Second, to what extent 
did the Japanese government make diplomatic commitments to the international 
regulation of LAWS from a neoliberalist perspective? Third, outside these 
diplomatic commitments, were there any domestic and realist factors which 
influenced Japan’s decision not to support a legally binding treaty to ban LAWS? 
Fourth, how have international and structural factors influenced Japan’s policy 
on LAWS? The purpose of this article is to provide answers to these research 
questions and multilayered perspectives surrounding Japan’s policy toward the 
legal regulation of LAWS. By applying “analytical eclecticism,” combined with 
theoretical aspects of orthodox international relations theory (classical liberalism, 
neoliberalism, classical realism, and neorealism), this article seeks to elucidate 
multiple factors behind Japan’s policy toward LAWS regulation and to explore 
possible pathways toward international regulation of LAWS.
Literature Review: Pros and Cons on the Development of AI Weapons
The notion of “autonomous weapons” is not necessarily a new one. For instance, 
“landmines” are able to select and engage their own targets causing lethal 
consequences (Robillard 2018). Likewise, Germany developed and utilized 
autonomous acoustic torpedoes during the Second World War (Advisory Council 
on International Affairs 2015, 8). Still, the development of AI technology for 
military use has brought about concern regarding its potential mutations for 
warfare. The issue of robotics and AI technology was examined by Ray Kurzweil, 
who argues that the ability of AI would surpass that of human beings (Kurzweil 
2005). Noel Sharkey (2007) warns that “robot wars are a reality” and suggested 
creating “international legislation and a code of ethics for autonomous robots at 
war before it is too late.” One of the first academic publications addressing issues 
with LAWS was authored by Peter W. Singer. In the book Wired for War: The 
Robotics Revolution and Conflict in the 21st Century, Singer (2009) cautions that 
autonomous weapons may drastically change the nature of armed conflict.
In an official report submitted to the United Nations General Assembly 
(UNGA) on August 23, 2010, Philip Alston (2010) points out the issue of 
unmanned or robotic systems, in light of international humanitarian law. A report 
by the Human Rights Watch and the International Human Rights Clinic Human 
Rights Program at Harvard Law School (2012), “Losing Humanity: The Case 
Against Killer Robots,” provides critical analysis on killer robots in the context 
of human rights. On November 21, 2012, the United States Department of 
Defense (USDOD) officially announced its policy on the development and use of 
autonomous weapons systems, expressing that the Department of Defense (DOD) 
was not projected to develop “fully autonomous” AI weapons, which would be 
capable of conducting military operations without human control (USDOD 
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2012), but that the DOD had already developed “semi-autonomous” weapons. In 
an official report submitted to the Human Rights Council of the UNGA on April 
9, 2013, Christof Heyns (2013) suggests that states should establish “national 
moratoria” on “lethal autonomous robotics” (LARs) through the jurisdiction of 
international humanitarian and human rights law.
Di Nucci and Santoni de Sio (2016) address issues relating to drones as 
“remotely controlled weapons” from legal, philosophical, and socio-technical 
perspectives. Armin Krishnan (2009) examines the technological opportunities 
and legal and ethical problems of autonomous robots in terms of international 
law. Alex Leveringhaus (2016) also investigates both the negative and positive 
aspects of autonomous weapons, particularly the question of legal responsibility 
in automated warfare. Likewise, Jha (2016) analyzes the moral, ethical, and legal 
issues of killer robots. Additionally, Ingvild Bode and Hendrik Huelss (2018) shed 
light on changing “norms” regarding the international regulation of autonomous 
weapons from a constructivist perspective.
In contrast, Michael N. Schmitt and Jeffrey S. Thurnher (2013) oppose the 
campaign to ban autonomous weapons, arguing that the application of the law of 
armed conflict could regulate the development and use of autonomous weapon 
systems. Likewise, Kenneth Anderson and Matthew Waxman (2013) argue that 
not prohibition but the regulation of development and use of autonomous weapon 
systems is appropriate for international law. Anderson, Reisner, and Waxman 
(2014, 395-98) reinforce this argument and criticize the campaign to ban LAWS, 
calling them “misguided calls.” Moreover, Vincent C. Müller (2016) explicitly 
opposed the legal prohibition of the development and use of LAWS, arguing that 
LAWS would reduce human suffering in armed conflicts and would not pose a 
threat to humanity.
One of the most difficult problems in the study of LAWS is the definition 
(Crootof 2015), since LAWS do not exist yet. Human Rights Watch classified 
autonomous weapons systems into three types: (1) “human-in-the-loop weapons 
(robots that can select targets and deliver force only with a human command);” 
(2) “human-on-the-loop weapons (robots that can select targets and deliver force 
under the oversight of a human operator who can override the robots’ actions);” 
and (3) “human-out-of-the-loop weapons (robots that are capable of selecting 
targets and delivering force without any human input or interaction).” The second 
and third types are categorized as “killer robots” that need to be legally banned 
before they are developed and deployed to battlefields (Human Rights Watch 
and International Human Rights Clinic Human Rights Program at Harvard Law 
School 2012, 2-3). LAWS as “fully autonomous weapons” should be categorized 
as the third type.
Meanwhile, previous scholarly works on Japan’s policy on LAWS are limited, 
and even less attention has been paid to theoretical explanations of the issue. This 
research gap stems from the fact that the LAWS issue is a relatively new research 
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field in Japan. Notably, all legislators of both ruling and opposition parties 
showed their opposition to the creation of LAWS because they believe that LAWS 
may violate international humanitarian law and might occasion tremendous 
human rights violations. The Japanese government, however, has been reluctant 
to ban LAWS by creating a legally binding treaty, arguing that it was premature 
to jump to such a conclusion. But why is the government ambivalent to LAWS 
issues? In an attempt to provide multiple explanations of Japan’s policy toward 
LAWS, theoretical viewpoints supplied by international relations are applied in 
the following sections.
Aimed at investigating multiple theoretical factors for Japan’s policy on lawful 
prohibition of LAWS, this article employs “analytical eclecticism” as a research 
method, combined with orthodox realist and liberalist theories of international 
relations. In the field of Japanese politics and international relations, analytical 
eclecticism was originally proposed by Peter Katzenstein (2008, 3), who observed 
that: “Some writings on Japanese security may, in the future, be able to take 
a more eclectic turn, by incorporating elements drawn from three different 
styles of analysis—the testing of alternative explanations, the rendering of 
synthetic accounts, and historically informed narratives.” By applying analytical 
eclecticism, this article attempts to examine Japan’s policy on LAWS from four 
theoretical perspectives—classical liberalism, neoliberalism, classical realism, and 
neorealism. Since observers of international relations and Japanese politics tend 
to take on either a particular or a number of theoretical stances, this research 
aims to contribute to providing an original analysis with multilayered theoretical 
explanations of Japan’s policy on LAWS.
Classical Liberalism: The Political Debate on the Prohibition of 
LAWS in Japan
From the perspective of classical liberalism or idealism based on the premise 
that the “application of reason and ethics to international relations” can lead to 
international peace (Kegley and Blanton 2011, 37-38), it is understandable for 
Japanese politicians to support the legal prohibition of LAWS. From a classical 
liberalist viewpoint, it is fair to argue that there has existed “antiwar pacifism” 
and a culture of “antimilitarism” in Japan triggered by the devastation of the Asia 
Pacific War, especially the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki (Berger 
1993, 1998). In addition, Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution, which stipulates 
renunciation of war and non-possession of war capabilities (NDL 1946), has 
impacted Japan’s security policy and Japan’s attitude toward militarism. Since 
2015, legal regulation or a complete ban on killer robots has been discussed in 
the Japanese National Diet by some legislators who oppose the creation of LAWS 
from ethical and legal viewpoints.
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On April 14, 2015, Kazuyuki Hamada of the Party for Future Generations 
(Jisedainoto) raised the issue of LAWS for the first time as a member of the Diet. 
He asked the question of how the Japanese government should address this 
issue during an informal meeting of experts on LAWS in Geneva, held April 13-
17, 2015. State Minister for Foreign Affairs Minoru Kiuchi explained that “it 
is important to reach an international understanding with other countries on 
LAWS through the exchange of opinions among experts” (NDL 2015). Hamada 
then asked how the Ministry of Defense (MOD) should respond to the regulation 
of LAWS. In response, Defense Minister Gen Nakatani explained that the MOD 
would continue to research the application of an “unmanned system” to the Self-
Defense Forces (SDF), so that the SDF could reduce the burden of “surveillance” 
as well as the disposal of “explosive substances” (ibid.).
On December 1, 2017, Seiichi Kushida of the Japan Innovation Party (Nihon 
Ishinnokai) raised the issue of LAWS in the Committee on Education, Culture, 
Sports, Science, and Technology of the Lower House. In response, Yoshimasa 
Hayashi, as Minister for Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology 
(MEXT), stated that the Japanese government supports the international 
regulation of AI technology for military use (NDL 2017a). On December 5, 2017, 
Kuniko Inoguchi of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), formerly a professor of 
international politics at Sofia University and former Ambassador Extraordinary 
Plenipotentiary to the Conference on Disarmament, raised concerns about LAWS 
and requested that the Japanese government support international negotiations 
on the legal regulation of LAWS within the framework of the CCW. In response, 
State Minister for Foreign Affairs Masahisa Sato stated that the Japanese govern- 
ment recognized the possible impact of LAWS on security issues, and assured the 
public that Japan has no intention of developing “fully autonomous weapons.” 
Notably, Inoguchi suggested that LAWS should be legally prohibited by the 
creation of “Protocol 6 of the CCW” (NDL 2017b).
On February 14, 2018, Kiyohiko Toyama of Komeito asked Defense Minister 
Itsunori Onodera whether the Japanese government had plans to develop LAWS. 
Onodera replied that although there was no consensus on the definition of LAWS, 
the “MOD had no plans to develop” such weapons. At the same time, Onodera 
emphasized that the Defense Ministry would seek to research and develop the 
application of AI technology on Japan’s defense equipment, “for the purpose of 
securing safety and mitigating the burden on [SDF] staff ” (NDL 2018a). Likewise, 
Foreign Minister Taro Kono confirmed that the Foreign Ministry would be 
actively involved in the international discussion concerning the legal regulation 
of LAWS within the framework of the CCW (ibid.).
On March 9, 2018, Kiyohiko Toyama raised the issue of LAWS in the 
Committee on Foreign Affairs in the Lower House. He pointed out that China 
seeks to improve its research and development of AI weapons systems, and that 
South Korea had already deployed an AI-equipped machine gun, SGR-A1, to the 
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Korean Demilitarized Zone. In response to Toyama’s remark, Foreign Minister 
Kono assured the Committee that the Japanese government would not create 
“completely autonomous weapons that are out of human control” (NDL 2018b). 
Additionally, Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Defense Tatsuo Fukuda stated 
that though there is no clear definition of LAWS or semi-LAWS, the Japanese 
government would not develop weapons systems “which are prohibited by 
domestic and international laws.” Toyama then emphasized that LAWS could lead 
to a third revolution in warfare, and therefore, LAWS should be legally regulated 
before it is ever completed (ibid.).
On April 18, 2018, Shinji Oguma of the Party of Hope (Kibonoto) touched 
on the issue of LAWS in relation to the Safe Schools Declaration. Oguma 
argued that unlike human beings who can avoid attacking schools in wartime, 
killer robots might not be able to follow the guidelines of the declaration (NDL 
2018c). On November 14, 2018, Kiyohiko Toyama raised the LAWS issue in 
the Committee on Foreign Affairs in the Lower House again. Toyama asked for 
Japan’s response to the second meeting of experts on LAWS, within the framework 
of the CCW, held in August 2018. Foreign Minister Taro Kono replied that the 
“Japanese government would like to positively and constructively participate in 
the international discussion” on the legal status of LAWS “in order to agree on a 
shared understanding” of the LAWS issue (NDL 2018d). 
On January 28, 2019, Foreign Minister Kono expressed his concern about 
LAWS in the Diet, stating “just as gunpowder and nuclear weapons changed the 
way wars were conducted in the past, artificial intelligence could fundamentally 
alter the course of future wars” (Asahi Shimbun 2019). On March 11, 2019, a 
project team of Komeito presented a proposal for Japan to take a leadership role 
in the international regulation of LAWS to Foreign Minister Kono. Notably, 
Komeito requested that the foreign minister facilitate international agreement on 
the regulation of LAWS, such as a “political declaration” or a “code of conduct” 
within the framework of the CCW (Japan Times 2019). Furthermore, Kaneshige 
Wakamatsu of Komeito in the House of Councillors on April 4, 2019 argued 
that Japan should proactively contribute to the international regulation of LAWS 
because Japan is the sole state that has suffered from nuclear weapons (NDL 
2019). Significantly, Wakamatsu’s argument for regulating LAWS is consistent 
with antiwar/antinuclear pacifism as well as classical liberalism. 
As shown in the proceedings of the National Diet, the Japanese legislators 
of both ruling and opposition parties expressed their support for the legal 
prohibition or regulation of LAWS on ethical and legal grounds. Their opposition 
to the creation of LAWS is congruous with Japan’s antiwar pacifism and 
antimilitarist culture, as a philosophical component of classical liberalism.
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Neoliberalism: Japan and the International Debate on the 
Prohibition of LAWS
From the perspective of neoliberalism, which rests upon the premise that 
“international cooperation” is possible and desirable in international relations by 
establishing “international regimes” or international legal frameworks (Kegley 
and Blanton 2011, 42-43), it is natural and ideal for Japan to participate in 
international discussions concerning the legal regulation of LAWS. In light of 
neoliberalism, Japan’s contribution to “international cooperation,” based on the 
Preamble of the Japanese Constitution, can be regarded as liberal internationalism 
(O’Hanlon 2007). In fact, the Preamble of the Japanese Constitution emphasizes 
the importance of Japan’s responsibility to international cooperation (NDL 
1946). The international movement to restrict LAWS, especially the Campaign 
to Stop Killer Robots, has been active since 2012 and the UN is discussing the 
international regulation of LAWS as an issue of arms control and disarmament, 
to which the Japanese government has made a continuous commitment.
At a CCW conference in November 2013, it was decided that LAWS 
related issues should be discussed. In May 2014, Japanese Ambassador to the 
Conference on Disarmament Toshio Sano, officials of Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
(MOFA), MOD, and Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI), as well as 
Professor Heigo Sato of Takushoku University, as an expert on arms control and 
disarmament, attended the CCW to discuss LAWS (Delegation of Japan to the 
Conference on Disarmament 2019). 
In the CCW conference held in Geneva on May 13, 2014, Japanese Ambassador 
Toshio Sano explained Japan’s stance on LAWS and expressed deep appreciation 
for the role of civil society in contributing to awareness of humanitarian 
concerns related to the development of LAWS. Sano stressed that the Japanese 
government was taking an interest in the LAWS issue and would like to engage 
in international discussions. He also stated that Japan would continue to research 
and develop “non-lethal autonomous technology for defense purposes” but 
that the government would not develop “fully autonomous” weapons systems 
(Delegation of Japan to the Conference on Disarmament 2014a).
In the CCW conference on November 13, 2014 which took place in Geneva, 
Ambassador Sano explained Japan’s stance on LAWS in a speech. Sano com- 
mended the French Ambassador at the informal meeting of experts on LAWS in 
May 2014, calling his leadership “fruitful and insightful,” and expressed Japan’s 
support for further discussions on LAWS within the framework of the CCW 
(Delegation of Japan to the Conference on Disarmament 2014b).
The second informal meeting of experts on LAWS in the CCW was held in 
Geneva on April 13, 2015. The Japanese government expressed its support for 
the meeting to facilitate a discussion of the core concepts regarding LAWS, such 
as its definition, the implications of autonomy, and “meaningful human control.” 
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Furthermore, the government stated that Japan had no plan to develop “fully 
autonomous” weapons systems (UNOG 2015).
On October 26, 2015 in New York, Ambassador Sano delivered a speech 
at the first committee of the Seventieth Session of the UNGA. Sano stated that 
Japan commended the “leadership of Germany in the second informal meeting 
of experts” and that Japan would support further discussion, particularly on 
the definition of LAWS, for the Fifth CCW Review Conference in 2016 (MOFA 
2015). On November 12, 2015, Sano made a speech at the CCW conference in 
Geneva and expressed Japan’s view that “it is most important to identify broader 
common ground for our understanding” such as the definition of LAWS and the 
concept of meaningful human control (Delegation of Japan to the Conference 
on Disarmament 2015). The third CCW meeting of experts on LAWS chaired by 
German Ambassador Michael Biontino was held in Geneva on April 11, 2016. In 
the meeting, the Japanese government submitted its working paper on LAWS and 
stressed the importance of the meeting (UNOG 2016).
On November 13, 2017, the first meeting of the “Group of Governmental 
Experts” (GGE) on LAWS as a subsidiary body of the CCW was held in Geneva. 
The mandate of the GGE is decided based on the High Contracting Parties 
to the CCW, and the experts widely discussed issues related to LAWS from 
legal, ethical, military, and technological perspectives (UNODA 2017; UNOG 
2019b). The 2017 CCW conference was held in Geneva on November 20, 2017. 
Ambassador Nobushige Takamizawa and officials of MOFA and MOD attended 
the meeting to discuss the arguments expressed in the first GGE session (MOFA 
2017). Ambassador Takamizawa, MOFA and MOD officials, and Professor Heigo 
Sato participated in the second GGE meeting on April 9, 2018 (MOFA 2018b). 
The Japanese Ambassador and officials of the MOFA and the MOD attended 
the third GGE meeting on August 27, 2018, where they argued that the Japanese 
government would not develop LAWS and that “meaningful human control” over 
weapons should be required (MOFA 2018c). 
On November 19, 2018, Ambassador Takamizawa and Japanese foreign 
and defense officials attended the CCW conference to discuss concerns about 
LAWS in Geneva (MOFA 2018d). On March 25-29, 2019, the GGE on LAWS 
was held within the framework of the CCW in Geneva. The Japanese govern- 
ment submitted a working paper to the GGE on March 21, 2019, in which the 
government requested the GGE facilitate a “direction towards possible future 
actions of the international community on LAWS,” in order to reach a “mutual 
understanding” on the definition of LAWS and meaningful human control as well 
as a consensus on an “outcome document” (MOFA 2019, 2). 
Thus, the Japanese government has actively participated in international 
discussions to regulate LAWS in the framework of the CCW, demonstrating its 
international cooperation. At the same time, the Japanese government has been 
consistent about the need for “meaningful human control” as a key norm for 
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regulating the use of AI powered weapons. Japan’s support for the international 
regulation of LAWS in the CCW framework has been coherent and it can be 
regarded as international cooperation on the theoretical premise of neoliberalism.
Classical Realism: Japan’s National Interests and the Development of 
AI Weapons
According to classical realism in international relations theory, it is logical for 
sovereign states to pursue their national interests and increase economic and 
military power for independence and survival (Kegley and Blanton 2011, 31-
32; Morgenthau 2006). This is how the Japanese government has developed and 
“normalized” its defense capabilities (Hook 1996; Oros 2008). In this sense, the 
classical realist perspective explains why the Japanese government has been 
reluctant to support the legal prohibition of LAWS, despite its active participation 
in the CCW. Japan’s reluctance to enact a legal ban on LAWS is related to 
its national interests, particularly in the application of AI technology to the 
defense capabilities. As observed by Heigo Sato (2017, 59), in terms of national 
interests, it is politically and militarily disadvantageous for states to prohibit the 
development of military technology, because the military necessity might arise in 
the future. The same is true for the international regulation or prohibition of “fully 
autonomous” weapons systems which as of yet do not exist.
For example, Japanese Ambassador Sano made a speech at the CCW 
conference held on May 13, 2014 and stressed the importance of the “peaceful 
use” of autonomous technology by providing an example of the deployment of 
robots for search, rescue, and surveillance after the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear 
power plant disaster (Delegation of Japan to the Conference on Disarmament 
2014a). Although the Japanese government promised that Japan would not 
develop “robots with humans out of the loop,” the government also emphasized 
the significance of the “dual-use” nature of robotic technologies and argued that it 
is not easy to draw a line between civil use and military use (UNOG 2015).
At the 2016 CCW conference, the Japanese government expressed its 
concern that “technologies of autonomous systems usable for LAWS have a high 
affinity with those technologies that have been under research and development 
in civil use” (UNOG 2016). The government also argued that it is critical to 
“ensure the promotion, research, and development of the peaceful and sound use 
of robots by drawing on the expertise and experiences gained in other regimes 
dealing with dual-use technologies” (ibid.).
Notably, former Defense Minister Satoshi Morimoto argued that Japan 
should develop AI-equipped defense capabilities given the decreasing population 
of Japan. Morimoto explained that AI-equipped defense capabilities are 
important to the defense of Japan because the Japanese Self-Defense Forces 
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would be able to conduct military operations with less fear of death in the event 
of contingencies (NHK 2018a). Moreover, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of 
Japan expressed a cautious attitude toward the legal prohibition of LAWS because 
such an international legal framework might jeopardize Japan’s international 
competitiveness in the development of AI technology and robotics (Reuters 
2018).
The Japanese government argued that it was premature to create some 
international regulation on autonomous weapons because comprehensive 
understandings of the issue had not been discussed at the CCW. In particular, 
Ambassador Takamizawa pointed out that the potential for civil use of AI 
technology should be taken into consideration when discussing related LAWS 
issues (NHK 2018b). The Japanese government made a cabinet decision regarding 
the National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG) on December 18, 2018. The 
NDPG noted that the Japanese government would invest in AI-related defense 
equipment and that this could be a game changer in strategic environments. 
By analyzing the NDPG, Sankei Shimbun (2018) reported that Japan should 
not regard military use of AI technology as taboo, otherwise the development 
of military technology for national defense would be jeopardized. In fact, the 
Japanese government plans to “research and develop AI or unmanned equipment 
to secure safety and reduce the burden of the Self-Defense Forces” (Asahi 
Shimbun 2019). More specifically, it has been reported that Japan has developed 
“military drones” in cooperation with the United States and Israel (Prakash 
2017). In other words, the Japanese government has no active plans to create “fully 
autonomous” weapons systems, but has developed “semi-autonomous” defense 
capabilities.
Hence, from a classical realist viewpoint, the Japanese government has 
been cautious about creating a legally binding treaty to ban LAWS due to its 
national interests in the dual use nature of AI technology as well as the strategic 
importance of AI-equipped defense capabilities such as “semi-autonomous” 
defense systems. Moreover, as the joint development of “military drones” 
between Japan and the United States and Israel indicates, Japan’s policy on the 
development of AI weapons seems to be under the influence of the U.S. military 
strategy and structural and international factors as examined in the following 
section.
Neorealism: The Development and Deployment of AI Weapons in 
the World
According to neorealism, international relations is anarchic in cases where 
balance of power is important or a hegemonic state influences the policymaking 
of other countries (Kegley and Blanton 2011, 35, 66). From a neorealist perspec- 
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tive, Japan’s security policy has been shaped in response to the changing inter- 
national security environment (Pyle 2007; Oros 2017). In this regard, it is 
theoretically fair to consider that Japan’s policy toward LAWS has been influenced 
by U.S. policy on autonomous weapons in an anarchic world. Indeed, Japan has 
invested in the development of AI-equipped defense capabilities in response to 
the rise of Chinese military power and changing U.S. military strategy (Prakash 
2017).
The USDOD announced its policy on autonomous weapons systems in 
Directive 3000.09 on November 21, 2012, stipulating that the United States 
would not develop “fully autonomous” weapons systems. However, the USDOD 
document also noted that the United States would utilize “human-supervised” 
autonomous weapons systems, semi-autonomous weapons systems, and “non-
lethal” autonomous weapons systems (USDOD 2012, 3). In other words, the 
United States will develop AI-equipped weapons as long as they are not “fully 
autonomous” weapons systems which are completely out of human control.
The application of artificial intelligence to the automation of military 
technology has been pursued by both the Barack Obama and Donald Trump 
administrations. On November 15, 2015, the USDOD announced its so-called 
“third offset strategy” in response to the military modernization of China 
and Russia. The offset strategy of the United States is an “approach to military 
competition that seeks to asymmetrically compensate for a disadvantaged 
position” (NIDS 2017, 212). The third offset strategy is based on the advancement 
of AI and autonomy for military technology and operations (ibid., 213). In 
particular, the USDOD has tried to introduce “autonomous deep learning systems” 
into the military capabilities and developed “semi-autonomous” weapons, such 
as “unmanned underwater vehicles” (UUVs) (ibid., 214) and “unmanned aerial 
vehicles” (UAVs) that can autonomously decide to attack enemy aircraft (Leys 
2018, 52).
According to the National Security Strategy announced by President Donald 
Trump in December 2017, the U.S. government has plans to lead in research, 
technology, invention, and innovation, especially in the field of artificial intel- 
ligence from “self-driving cars” to “autonomous weapons” (White House 
2017, 20). For instance, it was reported that Google had made a contract with 
the USDOD to support a pilot project by applying its AI solutions to “drone 
targeting” (Fang 2018). The U.S. government, therefore, has clearly pursued 
supremacy in the field of AI or machine intelligence (MI) as a military strategy 
in response to the changing security environment. The Center for Strategic and 
International Studies (CSIS) argued that “MI will redefine the balance of both 
economic and military power around the world” (Carter, Kinnucan, and Elliot 
2018, 16). Russian President Vladimir Putin stated in September 2017 that 
“whoever becomes the leader in [MI] will become the ruler of the world,” and 
China’s New Generation of Artificial Intelligence Development Plan in 2017 
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stressed that “machine intelligence [is] the strategic technology that will lead in 
the future” (ibid.). Chinese President Xi Jinping “explicitly called for a greater 
national focus on military AI research” in 2017, and the Beijing Institute of 
Technology (BIT) recruited thirty-one talented teenagers to “train as the world’s 
youngest AI weapons scientists” (Kilbride 2018).
In reality, the development of AI military technology can be observed 
around the world, as shown in Table 1, though they are presently only “semi-
autonomous” or “human-supervised” weapons systems. The U.S. government 
released a video displaying “an autonomous drone swarm of 103 individual 
robots” flying over California. Kalashnikov, the main “defense contractor” for the 
Russian government, announced that it had manufactured autonomous weapons 
capable of deciding on shooting targets. Israel has developed an “autonomous 
loitering munition” called the Harop which can “dive-bomb radar signals” 
without human control, and has reportedly been deployed on battlefields. South 
Korea also has developed a “drone swarm” (Perrigo 2018). 
The development of AI powered military technology shows that it is 
politically and strategically important for these countries to possess autonomous 
weapons systems. This is a “strategic factor” explaining why the United States, 
Russia, and China should not support the international campaign to ban LAWS, 
as observed by Elke Schwarz of the International Committee for Robot Arms 
Control (ibid.). This can also be inferred as a structural reason for why Japan, as a 
key U.S. ally, has been reluctant to support the creation of a legally binding treaty 
to ban LAWS in an anarchic world. Japan’s policy on international regulation of 
LAWS has been inevitably influenced by the anarchic nature of the international 
system, as well as its military alliance with the United States, as emphasized by 
neorealist theorists.
Table 1. “Semi-Autonomous” Weapons Systems in Development or Operation
Human in the Loop Weapons Human on the Loop Weapons
Land Guardium and Border Protector (Israel)
SGR-1 (South Korea)
Iron Dome (Israel)
C-RAM, Patriot and THAAD (United States)
Sea Protector USV (Israel)
Sea Hunter (United States)
Aegis and CIWS Phalanx (United States)
Goalkeeper (Netherlands)
PMK-2 (Russia)
Air MQ-1 Predator (United States)
MQ-9 Reaper (United States)
Harpy, Harop (Israel)
Source: Compiled from Bode and Huelss (2018, 402); Iwamoto (2018, 290).
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The Future of International Regulation and Prohibition of LAWS
So far the stances of the Japanese government and Japanese Diet Members have 
been discussed from four theoretical perspectives. They have been supportive of 
the international regulation of LAWS as “fully autonomous” weapons systems, 
but the government has also been protective of peaceful or defensive uses of AI 
technology in an anarchic world, where several countries have already developed 
“semi-autonomous” weapons systems. Still, the question regarding the feasibility 
of legally regulating LAWS remains. Given the domestic and international 
debates on LAWS, how can the international community regulate, and perhaps 
even prohibit, the development and use of LAWS? There are at least three possible 
approaches to pre-emptively regulating or prohibiting the development of LAWS 
through international law.
First, as observed in this article, the CCW is a legitimate framework for 
regulating or prohibiting the development of LAWS. The CCW is a multilateral 
treaty which was created to “ban or restrict the use of specific types of weapons 
that are considered to cause unnecessary or unjustifiable suffering to combatants 
or to affect civilians indiscriminately” (UNOG 2019c). The legal components of the 
CCW are: Protocol 1 on “non-detectable fragments;” Protocol 2 on “prohibitions 
or restrictions on the use of mines, booby traps and other devices;” Protocol 3 on 
“prohibitions or restrictions on the use of incendiary weapons;” Protocol 4 on 
“blinding laser weapons;” and Protocol 5 on “explosive remnants of war” (ibid.). 
In the CCW framework, blinding laser weapons were pre-emptively prohibited 
before they were deployed on the battlefield. Likewise, the development of LAWS 
can, in theory, be pre-emptively outlawed by creating Protocol 6. However, a clear 
limitation of the CCW framework is its “rule of consensus” as a decision-making 
process (Acheson 2016, 1). In other words, if the United States, Russia, and other 
countries which have developed AI weapons intend to block the international 
regulation of LAWS in the CCW framework, it would be impossible for the 
international community to create a new protocol to ban LAWS.
Second, even if negotiations in the CCW framework result in failure, it 
would still be possible for either the international community or civil society 
to create a legally binding instrument. By creating such a treaty, not only the 
development and use but also the acquisition and procurement of LAWS would 
be prohibited. In fact, the international community and civil society have pursued 
the creation of a formal multilateral “treaty” banning LAWS, as with the case 
of the “Treaty on Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons” (TPNW) signed on July 7, 
2017. The TPNW was supported by as many as 122 countries in the UNGA, 
and acts as a legally binding framework for prohibiting and eliminating nuclear 
weapons. However, nuclear-armed states have yet to sign the TPNW, and Japan 
has been unsupportive of the treaty in spite of its status as the sole country to 
have experienced nuclear attacks (Akimoto 2018). The Japanese government 
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has argued that it opposes the TPNW because the treaty would widen the gap 
between nuclear and non-nuclear countries. Instead, the government decided 
to facilitate nuclear disarmament within the framework of the Treaty on the 
Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). Still, Japan’s diplomatic stance on 
nuclear disarmament and its opposition to the TPNW seem to be paradoxical 
(ibid.). As in the case of the TPNW, the Japanese government has been unsup- 
portive of the creation of a legally binding document to ban LAWS at this stage. 
Also, as in the case of the TPNW, it is highly unlikely that the United States and 
Russia would accept a legally binding instrument banning LAWS, and, as a result, 
the effectiveness of the possible treaty aiming to outlaw LAWS would be limited.
Third, it is feasible for the international community to confirm the applicability 
of Article 36 of the “Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 
1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts 
(Protocol 1),” adopted in Geneva on June 8, 1977 to AI weapons, and to agree on 
a “political declaration” of the outcome of the international negotiations around 
regulating LAWS. Article 36 of Protocol 1 of the Conventions on “new weapons” 
reads: “In the study, development, acquisition, or adoption of a new weapon, 
means, or method of warfare, a High Contracting Party is under an obligation 
to determine whether its employment would, in some or all circumstances, be 
prohibited by this Protocol or by any other rule of international law applicable to 
the High Contracting Party” (United Nations 1979, 21). A political declaration 
is not a legally binding document, but it is notable to have reached a certain 
consensus on international regulation and prohibition of LAWS. Of course, civil 
society, especially the Campaign to Stop Killer Robots, would prefer the creation 
of a legally binding treaty as the ultimate goal, but the political declaration can 
be seen as the first step toward a more exhaustive international agreement on the 
regulation and prohibition of LAWS. In retrospect, the “Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights,” adopted by the UNGA on December 10, 1948, was not legally 
binding in the strictest definition, but the declaration was eventually upgraded to 
the “International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights” adopted by the UNGA 
on December 19, 1966 (United Nations 1976). Therefore, it is still possible for the 
international community and civil society to upgrade the political declaration to 
ban LAWS into a legally binding treaty. This is one of the possible outcomes of 
this first step toward the pre-emptive illegalization of LAWS.
Conclusion
This article has examined Japan’s policy toward the international discussion 
surrounding the legal regulation of LAWS by applying theoretical perspectives 
of international relations. First, the classical liberalist perspective shows that 
Japanese Diet members support the international discussion to ban LAWS 
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for moral and ethical reasons. Most importantly, it was revealed that there 
exists bipartisan support for legal prohibition of LAWS within the Japanese 
National Diet. Therefore, it is fair to argue that the political stances of Japanese 
legislators, as well as Japan’s antiwar pacifism, are consistent with the premise of 
classical liberalism. Second, Japan’s participation in and support for the CCW 
conferences and GGE meetings are congruous with the premise of neoliberalism, 
i.e. international cooperation in creating international regimes. Although the 
Japanese government has been cautious of outlawing the creation of LAWS by 
creating a legally binding treaty at this stage, the government has promised not to 
develop LAWS and argued that LAWS should not be created under the terms of 
international law.
Third, from a classical realist perspective, the Japanese government has 
sought to protect its national interests in relation to the regulation of LAWS. The 
government has indicated concerns that if the legal regulations on AI weapons 
apply to the civil use of AI technology, it might jeopardize Japan’s international 
competitiveness in the fields of robotics and AI. Moreover, it is obvious that the 
Japanese government would like to facilitate the use of AI technology for the 
defensive purpose of lessening the physical and psychological burdens of the 
SDF. Fourth, a neorealist viewpoint provides an assertive explanation on why the 
United States, Russia, China, and other countries have made efforts to apply AI 
technology to their military strategies in an anarchic world. It is logical that the 
U.S. policy on LAWS could influence Japan’s defense and strategic policy, as well 
as its AI-equipped defense capabilities.
Finally, it is evident that legal prohibition or regulation in the framework of 
the CCW is not the only pathway to illegalizing LAWS. The creation of a legally 
binding treaty banning the development of LAWS should not be ruled out as an 
ultimate goal, although such a treaty would not be supported by the United States, 
Russia, or other countries that are interested in the enhancement of their “semi-
autonomous” weapons systems. Still, it is possible for the Japanese government 
and other UN member states to facilitate international discussions and agree on 
a “political declaration” to regulate LAWS as a first step. Such a declaration can 
be upgraded into an international agreement which provides a legally binding 
framework. It may be difficult for the international community to completely 
regulate or illegalize LAWS once such weapons systems are created and deployed. 
The development of LAWS could transform the nature of future military conflicts 
in an inhumane and catastrophic manner. Therefore, Japan, as a former militarist 
state that invaded countries of the Asia Pacific region, as a pacifist state with a 
Peace Constitution, as the sole state to have suffered from nuclear bombings, and 
as a leader in technology, is responsible for spearheading further international 
discussions on the legal prohibition or regulation of LAWS.
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